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Corruption by government officials violates the social contract between ordinary people and 
the government. Perceived government corruption diminishes the legitimacy of the political 
system and reduces people’s trust in the government. Corruption’s erosive effect on government 
legitimacy and political trust has been a problem for many countries, including the trilateral 
countries, new democracies in Latin America, and both democratic and authoritarian countries in 
East Asia (e.g., Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chang & Chu, 2006; Della Porta, 2000; Pharr & 
Putnam, 2000; Seligson, 2002). Moreover, when corruption is perceived to be widespread and 
common, such popular beliefs may contribute to sustaining corruption in a society (e.g., Manion, 
2004). 
In reality, however, only a small number of people have personally experienced the 
corruption of government officials. This is true not only for people in Europe and North America, 
where corruption is widely acknowledged as limited in its scope, but also for those in societies 
where corruption is conceded to be common, like many Latin American, East European, and East 
Asian countries. Research in Mexico (Bailey & Paras, 2006) and Russia (Sharafutdinova, 2010), 
as well as our own survey conducted in mainland China in 2002, reveals that the large majority 
of people do not have personal experiences of corruption. Such a situation raises a critical and 
theoretically important question, that is, if people themselves do not have experiences of 
corruption, how do they acquire such perceptions? Why do some people perceive their 
government to be more seriously corrupt than others? Theoretically, understanding how people’s 
perceptions of government corruption are formulated can help us identify cognitive mechanisms 
that contribute to the regime legitimacy crisis witnessed by numerous societies (e.g., Booth & 
Seligson, 2009), and further clarify the possible role of this popular belief in the vicious circle of 
corruption intensification.  
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We argue that in many cases, people’s perceptions of government corruption are based on 
indirect information from various sources, including formal channels like mass media and 
informal ones such as rumors. And informal information sources are of particular salience in 
shaping such perceptions in societies like Russia and mainland China, where the mass media 
have been controlled to various extents by their respective governments. Living in societies 
without a guaranteed free flow of information, people tend to seek information from unofficial 
sources like grapevine rumors and gossip. Moreover, such unofficial sources often provide 
people with information that their regime does not want to be circulated. Thus, in such societies, 
the coexistence of controlled mass media, which provide people with information that the 
government has tailored and intended for political propaganda and/or mobilization, and 
grapevine news, which provides people with rich but mostly negative information about the 
government, generates some complex but fascinating dynamics in shaping people’s perceptions 
of government corruption. 
In this paper, we use a unique combined data set to test the impacts of a variety of 
information on Chinese citizens’ perceptions of corruption in their local governments. We find 
that grapevine news, which is often full of speculations and deliberate distortions, can exert a 
strongly negative influence on people’s perceptions of government corruption. But more 
importantly, information from different sources also interacts with each other: formal coverage of 
corruption cases in controlled mass media can significantly dilute the negative impact of 
grapevine news on public perceptions of corruption, presumably by filling in informational gaps 
and clarifying unfounded speculations. Our findings suggest that authoritarian regimes may still 
benefit from “propaganda,” even in the era of information explosion, through cunning media 
control and manipulation. In comparison with the situation of fully blocking access to unwanted 
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information in the mass media, controlled-liberalization of mass media with strategic agenda-
setting and issue framing may help authoritarian regimes significantly improve their public 
image and even contribute to their longevity to some extent.  
We start our analyses by presenting the results of questions on perceived corruption in a 
2002 mainland China national survey as part of the Asian Barometer Survey I (hereafter ABS I). 
The results show that in addition to the media controlled by the government, Chinese citizens 
also rely heavily on grapevine rumors for pertinent information on government corruption. We 
then review existing literature on the effects of distinct information sources and develop 
competing hypotheses to explain the impacts of information from different sources on people’s 
perceptions of corruption. Then, using the ABS I data and a data set compiled on the number of 
corruption cases reported in Chinese local newspapers in 2002, we test those hypotheses. We 
conclude with a discussion on the implications of the findings in this paper. 
Popular Perceptions of Corruption in China 
      Ordinary Chinese people may use the word corruption, or fubai, referring to any form of 
improper behavior by government officials that they are dissatisfied. It can range from economic 
crimes such as graft, bribery, and embezzlement, to official malfeasance less relevant to 
monetary gains, such as shirking and torture, as well as to individual misbehavior indicating 
moral decay, such as having mistresses (e.g., Guo, 2008; Wedeman, 2005). In ABS I, several 
questions were used to tap people’s perceptions of corruption, as well as their possible 
information sources.1 Two of them: “how widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking 
are in your local government?” and “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking 
are in the central government?” were designed to measure people’s perceptions of the corruption 
in local and central governments respectively. Answer categories to both questions were: “Not at 
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all”, “Not many people”, “Fairly common”, and “Almost everyone is corrupt.” 
[Figure 1 about Here] 
Figure 1a illustrates the weighted frequencies of respondents’ answers to both questions. 
Regarding local governments, 8.29% of the respondents answered “Not at all,” 32.12% opted for 
“Not many people,” 33.71% chose “Fairly common,” and 3.93% of the respondents said 
“Almost everyone is corrupt.” Meanwhile, 21.95% of the answers were DKs. Regarding the 
central government, 10.95% of the respondents answered “Not at all,” 27.73% opted for “Not 
many people,” 6.72% chose “Fairly common,” and 0.30% of the respondents answered “Almost 
everyone is corrupt.” 54.30% of the answers were DKs. It is clear that survey respondents, on 
average, perceived more corruption in local governments than in their central government. At the 
same time, many people did not have much information to provide meaningful evaluations of 
government corruption in China, i.e., around 22% chose DK regarding corruption in their local 
governments and even more respondents, around 54%, chose DK regarding corruption in the 
central government. To avoid possible and unpredictable biases in empirical analysis due to too 
many missing values, we focus on respondents’ perceptions of corruption in local governments 
in the following analyses. 
 After asking about people’s perceptions of corruption in China, interviewers also probed 
respondents for any personal experiences of corruption: “Have you or your families personally 
experienced any government corruption in recent years?” 20.05% of the respondents gave 
positive answers; 77.59% gave negative answers. This finding, combined with the information in 
Figure 1a, clearly reveals that many people in China in 2002 actually believed that corruption in 
local governments was a fairly common or even prevalent problem, despite lacking personal 
experience of corruption. How did such perceptions develop among Chinese people? To answer 
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this question, interviewers further asked those respondents without personal experiences about 
their primary sources for pertinent information on corruption in local governments. 2  These 
results are shown in Figure 1b.  
As displayed in Figure 1b, among those without personal experience with corruption, 
17.27% learned about corruption from other people; 2.77% learned from colleagues; 56.78% 
learned from the mass media (controlled by the regime); 1.03% learned from internal documents; 
and 26.36% did not provide meaningful answers. Given respondents’ self-reported information, 
the mass media seem to be the most common source from which Chinese citizens learn about 
government corruption. Following this formal but indirect information channel, grapevine news 
is the second most commonly accessed information source, i.e., almost 20% of the respondents 
obtained some sort of information about official corruption from other people or their colleagues. 
These findings beg a serious but rarely addressed question: how do people process possibly 
conflicting information acquired from different sources? More specifically, what are the impacts 
of official news coverage about corruption on public perceptions of government corruption? 
What are the impacts of grapevine rumors? How do different information sources interact with 
each other in influencing people’s perceptions?  
Mass Media Exposure, Grapevine Rumors, and Political Attitudes  
Mass media’s effects on public opinion have been controversial among scholars, partially 
due to the difficulty in capturing its exact effect on opinion formation (Bartels, 1993). For such a 
reason, early research of media impacts on people’s political attitudes and behavior, especially 
people’s voting behavior, concentrated primarily on the frequency of media exposure. This 
research found that mass media had “minimal effects” on people’s political choices (e.g., 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948).   
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Later scholars pay more attention to the content and form of media coverage and find that 
media has strong but primarily malign effects on people’s political attitudes. These scholars have 
even coined the term “videomalaise” for this argument (e.g., Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000). Some 
scholars blame watching television for reduced civic engagement because of its displacement of 
other leisure activities and community involvement, as well as the “mean world” syndrome due 
to its emphasis on violence and crime (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002; 
Putnam, 1995). Others argue that politics is often presented negatively on television, given its 
excessive emphasis on the “poll-driven horse race” and “strategic game frames” (Hart, 1994; 
Jamieson, 1992; Schudson, 1995). Moreover, market competition and the search for larger 
audiences and higher circulation figures have forced the media to dwell on dramatic news, 
“especially bad news about crime and conflict, death and disaster, political incompetence and 
corruption, sex and scandal” (Newton, 1999, p. 577). While the mass media are assigned the 
critical role of government watchdog, they are at the same time blamed for undermining 
democratic politics because of prevalent negative reporting. Following this logic, it is expected 
that formal media coverage of corruption in democracies is more likely to exacerbate citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption in their governments.  
In contrast, the mass media in authoritarian and other illiberal regimes are always influenced 
to varying extents by their states so as to forge supportive sentiment. Such regimes not only use 
media to mobilize political support, but also to shape people’s attitudes toward the government. 
This is even true for post-Mao China, where mass media are still heavily used for mobilization 
and propaganda (Shirk, 2011a). It is undeniable that over the past several decades, the Chinese 
government has gradually liberalized its news media through commercialization and 
marketization. Consequently, the party mouthpieces of the earlier communist regime have been 
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partially transformed into profit-making ventures financed by sales of advertisements and private 
investments. Commercial liberalization has dramatically reduced government influence over the 
selection, framing, and wording of news stories (Esarey, 2005). As a consequence, Chinese mass 
media have witnessed rising investigative reporting, exposures of environmental degradation, 
open confrontations between media and government regulatory institutions, and sensational 
coverage of official malfeasance. As most recent scholarly work on Chinese mass media shows, 
commercialized Chinese media is more convincing, more sophisticated, and capable of satisfying 
readers’ interest in real-life stories and problems (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011).  
However, it would be going too far to conclude that the authoritarian state has lost its control 
over the Chinese media, especially its news content. China’s media have been characterized as 
boasting “commercialization without independence”, enjoying “bird-caged press freedom”, and 
resembling “watchdogs on the party leashes” (Chen & Chan, 1998; Zhao, 2000). Major 
newspapers, radio and television stations are still subject to close supervision from the State 
Publication and Press Administration, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, 
and the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These institutions can 
influence the organization of the media industry, make personnel decisions, and most importantly 
issue directives for news content. Media practitioners are only free to report issues according to 
their own standards and decisions so long as they do not overstep certain boundaries set by the 
CCP. When an issue is seen as being core to social stability, economic growth, and the CCP’s 
survival, the state usually will and is able to exert considerable control over the Chinese news 
media (Stockmann, 2011). Thus, to most media scholars, commercialization has yet to change 
the nature of Chinese mass media (e.g., Hassid, 2008). 
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News coverage on official corruption is no doubt highly politically sensitive as such reports 
can embarrass government officials, arouse public resentment against the regime and lead to 
social unrest. Therefore, many investigative reports by journalists on official corruption in China 
may not appear in the media.3 Most news coverage of corruption that does appear in the media 
focuses on local governments and local officials. Instead of being presented as the result of 
institutional deficiencies and symptoms of a more systematic phenomenon, reported corruption 
cases are generally treated as isolated incidents and attributed to each convicted official’s 
personal problems and lack of self-discipline. Moreover, when dealing with high-profile cases, 
such as the former Beijing party secretary and mayor, Chen Xitong and Wang Baosen in 1995, 
and the former Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006, newspapers are required to use 
the so called “standard draft” (tonggao) provided by the Xinhua News Agency. 4  Pertinent 
contents, format, and even general tone of news reports were carefully synchronized by the Party 
(Gang & Bandurski, 2011). And most importantly, the reporting of such issues has been 
primarily framed as the success of the government’s anticorruption efforts. 5  Through such 
sophisticated media control, the CCP tries to make Chinese citizens believe in the government’s 
sincere and serious efforts against corruption, and that uncovered official corruptions are isolated 
incidents rather than examples of a systematic and more prevalent problem (Zhao, 2000). As 
such, media exposure in contemporary China, essentially different from that in democracies, may 
actually help the regime mobilize the society, shape a more positive public perception regarding 
the Chinese government’s anti-corruption commitment and efforts, and even lower the perceived 
severity and breadth of official corruption.   
Nevertheless, the CCP’s tight media control is unable to completely block the free flow of 
information. When formal sources of information are controlled, people use alternative sources 
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to acquire pertinent information. Among them, grapevine news is of particular interest and 
significance. Grapevine news can be simply defined as unofficial information transmitted via a 
mouth-to-mouth mechanism, which “works through and is animated by story-telling, rumor and 
gossip” (Ball & Vincent, 1998, p. 379). The impacts of grapevine news have been largely 
overlooked by political scientists, probably because most research on mass media and public 
opinion has focused on democratic societies with transparent governance and open information 
access. However, rumors are at their most rife “in the absence of other, more reliable sources of 
information. It is a way of filling in missing information or explaining the inexplicable” (Ball, 
1987, p. 219). Hence, grapevine news may naturally arise and affect people’s cognition of 
politics and behavior more significantly in societies wherein information is less easily accessible, 
like mainland China. 
An important characteristic of grapevine news is that it tends to exaggerate the reality of an 
issue, often presenting singular issues as more common problems. Therefore, rumors and gossip 
have an especially malignant effect, which could be highly seditious and fuel political 
insecurities. In fact, in many situations, grapevine rumors have been effectively used as 
“weapons of the weak” to criticize the authority offstage (Scott, 1985). Governments in 
traditional societies, e.g., England in the late 1500s and early 1600s, with limited information 
circulation through officially sanctioned channels were also especially concerned about the 
detrimental impact of wild stories and groundless speculations (Fox, 1997). Even in 
contemporary Argentina and Haiti, when the military junta in the 1970s and 1990s respectively 
cracked down on journalists and writers and stopped the free flow of information through the 
mass media, the public resorted to information transmitted by word of mouth. In these violent 
and dangerous situations, the throng of frequently repeated rumors could “calcify into accepted 
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representation of social reality and political life” (Perice, 1997, p. 1).  
Furthermore, grapevine news is especially powerful when disseminating information about 
certain significant topics, particularly negative news that formal authorities are disinclined to 
discuss in public.6 To some degree, grapevine news is similar to tabloids news, which tends to 
cover sensational and negative stories. But unlike tabloid news, grapevine news cannot be 
effectively regulated and censored by government. The nature of grapevine news thus 
encourages political dissidents to sometimes intentionally forge negative news, distort facts, and 
spread rumors about the government to promote their goals. For instance, in 1989 during the 
Tian’anmen incident, Huang Jing, a then-PhD student at Harvard University, claimed that Li 
Peng, the then-Premier of China, was shot in the leg during an assassination attempt by his 
bodyguard and Deng Xiaoping had been sick. Several American TV programs immediately took 
the two stories for real and reported those stories as developments in the students’ democratic 
movement. However, Huang later confessed under camera that he deliberately spread the rumor 
to force Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping to appear in public (Manheim, 1991, pp. 155-156).  
Finally, as Ball and Vincent argue, grapevine news in many cases has often been seen as 
reliable and trustworthy, thanks to its nature as “hot knowledge, based on affective responses or 
direct experiences” (1998, p. 389), and usually thought to be personal and reliable. Therefore, 
when people learn about corruption from the grapevine, they may tend to believe in the 
seriousness of government corruption and hold a negative view of the situation.  
Nevertheless, arguing that grapevine news tend to be perceived as reliable does not 
necessarily mean that grapevine news overrides official information once they interact. 
Grapevine information is not always digested uncritically either. As some recent work recognizes, 
elite rhetoric transmitted through official channels and interpersonal conversations usually have 
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competing effects on public opinion formation (e.g., Druckman & Nelson, 2003). Basically, 
official information might counteract grapevine news and dilute its impact. If the Chinese mass 
media are effective in mobilizing public opinion, carefully crafted and controlled media coverage 
of corruption might reduce or even defeat grapevine news’ effects on popular perceptions of 
corruption by clarifying speculations and eliminating ambiguities.  
Given the aforementioned theoretical reflections, we can derive the following hypotheses 
regarding the effects of media exposure and grapevine news on popular perceptions of corruption 
in Chinese local governments.  
H1: The mobilization effect of controlled mass media: strategic issue framing of official 
corruption in government controlled media may lower people’s perceptions of corruption in 
local governments.  
H2: The malignant effect of grapevine news: accessing grapevine news in China contributes to a 
higher perception of corruption in local governments.  
H3: The diluting effect of formal media coverage on grapevine news: carefully crafted and 
controlled mass media coverage on corruption cases in China can weaken grapevine news’ 
impact on people’s perceptions of corruption in local governments.  
Statistical Models and Results 
To test the above hypotheses, we combine ABS I data with a compiled dataset on the 
number of local official corruption cases reported in newspapers from different provincial-level 
administrative units in 2002.7 Media coverage of such corruption cases is collected from major 
local newspapers, including daily party newspapers, and some semi-commercialized, and 
commercialized newspapers.8  
Our dependent variable is a binary. Basically, we collapse people’s responses to the question 
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“How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local government?” into a 
dichotomous variable. Answers of “Not at all” and “Not many people” are coded as 0, indicating 
perceptions of a low degree of corruption. Answers of “Fairly common” and “Almost everyone 
is corrupt” are coded as 1, indicating perceptions of a high level of corruption.  
Three measurements of accessing formal and informal sources of information reported by 
survey respondents are included as our independent variables. Exposure to the mass media is 
measured by 1) respondents’ self-reported media exposure frequency: “How often do you read, 
listen to or watch political news?”9 And 2) the number of local corruption cases covered in the 
major local newspapers accessible to respondents.10 Access to grapevine news is gauged by 
respondents’ self-reported answers to the following two questions: “Within the last month, did 
you hear anything through grapevine rumors (xiaodao xiaoxi) concerning economics, politics, or 
society?” and “During the last month, did you discuss any grapevine rumors (xiaodao xiaoxi) 
with other people?” Respondents giving positive answers to either of these two questions are 
coded as possessing access to grapevine rumors.11 
The control variables include the level of economic development at both the provincial-level 
and individual-level, measured respectively by provincial per capita GDP and self-reported 
economic situation. Self-reported economic situation is measured by four questions: respondents’ 
employment status,12 and their current,13 prospective14 and retrospective15 evaluations of their 
family economic situation. We also control for a series of critical individual demographic and 
socioeconomic features identified by previous research as pertinent in shaping people’s political 
attitudes: 
Demographic features: Respondents’ age, 16  gender, 17  educational attainment, 18  and 
residential status.19 
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Personal experience of corruption: It is natural to expect that direct personal experiences of 
corruption can greatly increase one’s perceptions of government corruption.20  
Sense of relative deprivation: This is measured by perceived fairness between one’s income 
and capability. 21  Respondents who believed that their income did not fairly match their 
capability are more likely to blame corruption for this mismatch and, thus, perceive more 
corruption in local governments.  
Affiliation with the CCP: According to Anderson and Tverdova (2003), support of the 
regime attenuates the negative impact of corruption on government trust. We expect people 
affiliated with the ruling party to be government supporters, and more likely to perceive a lower 
level of corruption. 22 
Normative orientation toward collectivism: A lot of research has argued that social norms 
and culture can have certain impacts on popular perceptions of corruption (e.g., Bowser, 2001). 
The hierarchically structured cultural tradition, as well as the emphasis on order and collective 
interest, has been blamed of driving the higher tolerance of corruption in East Asian societies 
(Lipset & Lenz, 2000). If this is the case, it is possible that those who are normatively oriented 
toward collectivism are less likely to perceive corruption as a serious and prevalent problem in 
local governments. During the interview, respondents were asked if they strongly disagreed, 
disagreed, agreed, or strongly agreed with the following statements: 1) “Generally speaking, 
individual interest should be secondary to family interest;” 2) “For the sake of national interest, 
individual interest should be sacrificed;” and 3) “Sacrificing individual interest for collective 
interest is out of date now.”23 Respondents’ averaged scores over these three questions are used 
to measure their collectivistic orientations. 
Interpersonal trust: Perception of corruption is also influenced by one’s general view of the 
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world and society.24 Those who tend to trust others are more likely to trust government officials 
and perceive less corruption (Canache & Allison, 2005). 
Political interest: Persons who are interested in politics are more likely to access pertinent 
information and more capable of revealing their attitudes.25 
Before we test our hypotheses, one critical methodological issue has to be addressed: DKs in 
perceived corruption in local governments. Methodologically, two equally justifiable strategies 
can be used to address this issue. First, we can follow best practice dealing with missing values 
by generating multiple complete data sets using model-based imputations. Adopting this strategy, 
as shown in Rubin’s (1987) classical work, we basically take an agnostic view of missing values 
and use observable associations between missing observations and other revealed information of 
the same subjects to recover possible values of missing observations.26  
Second, we can also specifically model the data-generating process of DKs in the dependent 
variable and take that into consideration for statistical analysis. According to the accumulated 
wisdom in political psychology and survey methodology (e.g., Groves, Dillman, Eltinge, & Little, 
2001; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000), response to survey questions can be roughly 
conceptualized as a two-step process: 1) respondents give DKs due to, inner alia, cognitive or 
informational deficiencies; and 2) if pertinent information is available or respondents are willing 
to guess, they then choose the most appropriate one among provided answer categories. Thus, 
theoretically, DKs are not simply missing values that need to be recovered, but meaningful and 
informative cases that merit examination. Most recent scholarship on survey item non-response 
in mainland China suggest that cognitive and information deficiencies, rather than political fear, 
are the key driving force for DKs in politically sensitive survey questions (e.g., Ren, 2009; Yan, 
2008). In other words, DK-givers differ significantly from those providing meaningful answers 
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in terms of cognitive sophistication and information access. Thus, it is critical to take these 
differences into consideration through appropriate statistical modeling when examining on how 
popular belief on government corruption is sustained in today’s China. Empirically, this is a 
typical sample-selection issue. Following the seminal work of Heckman (1979), we specifically 
model 1) why some respondents were more likely to refuse to provide their perceptions of 
corruption in local governments; and 2) controlling this self-selection in providing meaningful 
answers to our key question, simultaneously estimate the impacts of the aforementioned factors 
on popular perceptions of government corruption.27  
Since both strategies can be methodologically justified, we decide to run both models and 
intentionally use the results from the two models, with different assumptions, theoretical 
considerations, and estimation approaches, to cross-validate the robustness of our findings. 28 If 
both models confirm or reject some hypotheses, our confidence on the validity of the findings 
would be significantly increased. However, if the results from the two models diverge, we should 
be very cautious making interpretations, given their sensitivity to model specifications. Table 1 
presents the results of Probit and Heckman Selection models. 
[Table 1 about here] 
In the subsequent analyses, we first examine the impacts of different information sources on 
popular perceptions of corruption in Chinese local governments, i.e., the highlighted section in 
Table 1. It is evident that despite their distinct nature, the two models provide similar results on 
the impacts of various information sources on popular perceptions of corruption in Chinese local 
governments. Thus, our following inferences on the impacts of different information sources on 
popular perceptions of government corruption are robust to model specifications.  
As expected, first-hand information based on personal experiences plays a significant role in 
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shaping Chinese citizens’ perceptions of corruption – those who have personal experiences of 
government corruption are significantly more likely to hold negative views of corruption in local 
governments. But as our analyses reveal, second-hand information from different sources also 
has significant impacts on people’s evaluations of government corruption.  
First of all, similar to the situation in liberal democracies, the frequency of media exposure 
does not have a statistically significant influence over popular perceptions of corruption in 
Chinese local governments. At the first glance, this finding seems to be a little surprising, as 
Figure 1b shows that more than 50% of the respondents claimed that they learned about 
government corruption primarily from the mass media. However, the finding should not be 
interpreted as media coverage does not play a role in shaping people’s perceptions of corruption 
in contemporary China. As revealed by both models, the number of corruption cases that covered 
in major local newspapers does significantly reduce people’s perceptions of corruption in their 
respective local governments. As the news coverage of corruption predominately frames the 
issue as 1) authorities have both the necessary determination and capability to eliminate 
corruption and 2) uncovered corruption cases are merely isolated incidents rather than examples 
of a systematic phenomenon, people may be led to believe that corruption is not prevalent in 
Chinese local governments, and that the singular cases that have been covered by the media 
actually demonstrate the intention and efficacy of their government in rooting out all corruption.  
Secondly, our analyses confirm that access to grapevine news makes people perceive a 
higher level of corruption in local governments. The vivid, though sometimes unfounded, 
content of grapevine news seems to be capable of effectively winning over some people’s minds 
and exacerbating their perceptions of government corruption. Hence, H1 and H2 are both 
confirmed by our empirical evidence. 
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Thirdly, it is critical to remind our readers that, given the existence of interaction items, the 
aforementioned regression coefficients of media exposure frequency, as well as access to 
grapevine news, can ONLY be interpreted as their respective impacts on popular perceptions of 
corruption in local governments when there is NO formal coverage of corruption cases in the 
local newspapers.29 As shown in Table 1, the two interaction terms are statistically significant in 
both Probit and Heckman Selection models. Such findings tell us that the formal coverage of 
corruption not only directly shapes public corruption perceptions, but also significantly 
moderates how media exposure frequency and access to grapevine news influence this critical 
public opinion.  
To facilitate our readers’ understanding of the interaction terms, we have run simulations on 
the marginal effects (based on the Heckman Selection estimates), i.e., impacts on the log-ratio of 
the probability of holding a positive view on corruption in Chinese local governments, of media 
exposure frequency and access to grapevine news respectively, as the number of reported 
corruption cases increases from 0 to 12 (the respective minimum and maximum value in our 
data). The marginal effects, as well as their correspondingly 95% confidence intervals, are 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The statistically significant and positive interaction between media exposure frequency and 
the number of media reported corruption cases seems to suggest that the more corruption cases 
are covered in newspapers, the less powerful the effect of media exposure frequency in soliciting 
a favorable view of the corruption in Chinese local governments.30 Nevertheless, as shown in 
Figure 2a, when the number of reported corruption cases grows from its minimum to the 
maximum, the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient of media exposure frequency always 
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cover zero: the marginal impact is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In other words, 
despite the statistical significance of this interaction effect, substantively it is negligible or 
marginal at best. 
In contrast, the interaction between access to grapevine news and the number of media 
reported corruption cases is negative and statistically significant. Given the positive and 
significant coefficient of access to grapevine news per se, this significant interaction suggests 
that when the formal information channel is completely blocked and people are only left with 
grapevine to form their perceptions of corruption in local governments, they can be easily lead 
away by the wild and negative speculations transmitted through grapevine news. However, when 
such corruption cases are covered in a carefully crafted and controlled way in newspapers, e.g., 
the situation in mainland China, pertinent information from officially sanctioned channels can 
contain and even suppress wild speculations, clear ambiguities, and even reorient people’s 
attention toward how the Chinese government has been fighting and deterring corruption. This 
then dramatically weakens the negative impact of grapevine news on popular perceptions of 
corruption in Chinese local governments. As shown in Figure 2b, when there is no officially 
reported corruption case in the media, the lower boundary of the 95% confidence interval of the 
marginal effect of accessing grapevine news is above zero: it is positive and significant at the 
0.05 level. When the number of reported corruption cases gradually increases up to the 
maximum value, the lower boundary of its confidence interval extends below zero; meanwhile, 
its upper boundary still hovers above zero. In other words, when there is some formal coverage 
of corruption cases in local newspapers, the substantive impact of accessing grapevine news is 
weakened, a decrease that rendered the coefficient no longer statistically different from zero at 
the 0.05 level. Thus, the diluting effect of formal coverage of corruption cases on grapevine news 
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is also confirmed to some extent by the empirical data.31 
Most other variables performed as expected in both models. Rural residents on average are 
less critical and perceive a lower level of corruption in local governments than urban residents.32 
Those who evaluate their current economic situation in a more positive way perceive less 
corruption in local governments. People who feel their incomes are unfair given their capability 
are also understandably more critical and perceive significantly more corruption. Besides, as 
found in existing research, people’s normative and psychological features also play roles in their 
perceptions of government corruption. Chinese citizens who are more inclined to trust other 
people or normatively oriented toward collectivism are significantly less likely to perceive 
serious corruption in their local governments. 
Conclusion and Suggestion 
In this paper, we systematically examined factors that could contribute to the formation of 
people’s perceptions of corruption in the local governments of a non-democratic society with 
considerable media control. Similar to their counterparts in some Latin American and Eastern 
European societies, the majority of Chinese citizens have few personal experiences of 
government corruption. They learn about corruption mainly from the mass media and 
information related by others, or the so-called “grapevine rumors.”  
To test the effects of information from different channels on public perceptions of 
governmental corruption, we combined ABS I survey data from mainland China with a dataset 
on local media coverage of government corruption cases. Using different modeling strategies, we 
consistently found that similar to the situation in democratic societies, the frequency of media 
exposure had a negligible effect on respondents’ perceptions of government corruption regardless 
of how much pertinent information was reported in the mass media. But more importantly, our 
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analyses show that the carefully and tightly controlled media’s coverage of corruption cases in 
China can actually significantly decrease people’s perceptions of corruption in local governments. 
This is compatible with most recent scholarship on media effects in authoritarian China (e.g., 
Shirk, 2011a; Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Basically, although Chinese mass media has been 
commercially liberalized over the past several decades, the CCP’s propaganda departments are 
still capable of setting the agenda for and framing the news coverage of issues they believe to 
have important socio-political implications. More specifically, to a large extent, the party-state 
can still effectively shape people’s perceptions of government corruption through their 
propaganda and mobilization through the controlled mass media.  
However, the seemingly airtight media control still leaves room for information from 
unofficial sources to affect public perceptions of corruption. Our findings suggest that grapevine 
news, including rumors and gossip, is particularly influential at delivering information about 
certain significant topics that the Chinese government has strong incentive to hide from the 
public, such as official corruption. The speculative nature of grapevine rumors usually has a 
negative impact on people’s attitudes on issues like government corruption. When there is little 
information revealed in the mass media on government corruption, ceteris paribus, Chinese 
citizens with access to grapevine news, on average, perceive more serious problems of 
corruption in local governments than those who do not have such access.  
But this does not mean the party-controlled mass media is completely powerless against 
grapevine rumors. Our analyses showed that media coverage on corruption actually diluted or 
even “defeated” the detrimental effects of grapevine rumors. This finding reveals a mechanism 
through which authoritarian regimes can subtly influence public opinion through skillful media 
control. In authoritarian societies, even if the government can keep people completely in the dark, 
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wild and groundless speculations may still be spread through word of mouth. Under those 
circumstances, grapevine news beyond government’s control can seriously damage its popular 
image and destabilize the regime. Counteracting those effects, carefully crafted news reports, 
especially regime-controlled media coverage of sensitive issues and consequential problems like 
corruption and political incompetence, can help mobilize support, solicit positive views from 
citizens, and even prolong the life of an authoritarian regime. This actually resonates with some 
of the findings from Norris and Inglehart’s examination on “cosmopolitan communications” with 
the World Values Survey data: “Democratic values are strongest in open societies that combine 
affluence with media freedom and borders open to information flows from abroad” (2009, p. 
256). In other words, in societies with tight and effective media control and manipulation, 
authoritarian regimes could successfully indoctrinate their citizens with anti-democratic values. 
And this facilitates authoritarian regimes’ defense against possible pressure for democratic 
transition.33 
Different from contemporary research on media effects in authoritarian societies, our 
research moves beyond the conventional focus on whether controlled mass media in these 
societies can directly lead to public opinions that favor their governments (e.g., Kern & 
Hainmueller, 2009; Parta, 2007). Incorporating the information from informal sources, e.g., 
grapevine news, that conventional pertinent research inclines to ignore, our work sheds light on, 
at least a small but critical part of the more nuanced and indirect mechanisms through which 
media control may work in authoritarian societies and favor the rule of authoritarian regimes. 
Thus, we strongly encourage future research to focus more on possible indirect effects of media 
control in authoritarian societies. 
Last but not least, we do recognize the limits of our data and findings in this paper. For 
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example, without systematic content analysis of news coverage on government corruption in 
Chinese mass media, we could not provide direct and systematic evidence on issue framing and 
agenda setting by the CCP in this regard. Basically, we only inferred that from case studies in 
second-hand literature and robust correlations revealed by regression analyses. Moreover, due to 
data limit, we cannot examine the role of Internet news, which shares some similarities with 
grapevine news due to the nature of cyberspace, though still under serious and systematic control 
and regulation in contemporary China, in people’s perceptions of government corruption. New 
information technologies’ power in defeating information control and manipulation, as well as 
the CCP’s increasing efforts in regulating online discourse and contents, actually provide another 
promising field for further examination on how different sources of information may interact 
with each other in shaping public opinion, particularly in authoritarian societies. Also, some 
dramatic changes in China’s mass media over the past decade cannot be captured by the national 
survey done in 2002. Nevertheless, given the CCP’s responses to the news coverage of the Tibet 
incident and Olympic Torch Relay in 2008, as well as its most recently released “National Image 
Promotion Advertisement” run in Times Square, it is reasonable to infer that the CCP might have 
significantly increased its efforts in improving its image among both domestic and international 
audiences through media campaigns. Moreover, as experienced China scholar Susan Shirk 
observes, “In addition to outright censorship, the Chinese government has learned to shape news 
content by using increasingly sophisticated press management methods” (Shirk, 2011b, p. 238). 
Therefore, we believe the CCP government might have been even more cautious and possibly 
more sophisticated in manipulating its domestic media for political purposes, like shaping 
popular perceptions of government corruption. However, whether this is the case or not in 
today’s China can only be answered with future systematic empirical work. 
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Figure 1a: “How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local government/ 
the central government?” 
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Figure 1b: “How did you acquire the information on corruption?” 
 
Figure 1: Perceived Corruption and Information Sources 
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Figure 2a: Simulated Marginal Effect of Exposure to Formal Media 
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Figure 2b: Simulated Marginal Effects of Exposure to Grapevine News 
 
Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Exposure to Formal Media and Grapevine News 
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Table 1: Results of Probit and Heckman Selection Models 
Probit Selection
Age  0.002 (0.003)  0.002 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003)
Male -0.033 (0.068) -0.088 (0.087)  0.145 (0.066)**
Education -0.047 (0.031) -0.052 (0.031)*  0.013 (0.034)
Rural resident -0.214 (0.088)** -0.224 (0.098)**  0.080 (0.087)
Employment Status  0.084 (0.107)  0.075 (0.126)
Current Economic Evaluation -0.195 (0.045)*** -0.197 (0.051)***
Retrospective Economic Evaluation -0.034 (0.042) -0.029 (0.043)
Prospective Economic Evaluation -0.075 (0.043)* -0.057 (0.042)
Income NOT matching capability  0.263 (0.078)***  0.225 (0.081)***
GDP per capita -0.003 (0.080) -0.013 (0.093)
CCP Affiliation -0.129 (0.067)* -0.116 (0.079)  0.115 (0.070)*
Political interest  0.013 (0.051)  0.231 (0.043)***
General social trust -0.434 (0.078)*** -0.451 (0.086)***
Collectivistic orientation -0.318 (0.146)* -0.343 (0.132)**
Personal live experience of corruption  0.802 (0.086)***  0.704 (0.222)***  0.633 (0.093)***
Media exposure frequency (MEF) -0.052 (0.047) -0.061 (0.051)  0.031 (0.030)
Grapevine news access (Xiaodao Xiaoxi ) (GNA)  0.357 (0.138)**  0.363 (0.162)**  0.239 (0.081)***
Number of reported corruption cases (NRC) -0.252 (0.119)** -0.264 (0.126)**
MEF*NRC  0.050 (0.028)*  0.051 (0.030)*
GNA*NRC -0.202 (0.089)** -0.245 (0.081)***
Intercept  2.130 (0.438)***  2.460 (0.486)***  0.003 (0.180)
Rho -0.356 (0.718)
Source: 2002 ABS I Mainland China Survey
Notes:
Entries are averaged results following the Rubin's rule over five imputed data sets
Sampling information incorporated using appropriate SVY commands in STATA 11 for linearized standard errors
* p < 0.1   ** p < 0.05   *** p < 0.01
Probit Model
Heckman Selection Model
 (Among Those Giving 
Meaningful Corruption 
Perceptions)
 (Who Are Likely to 
Give Meaningful 
Corruption Perceptions)
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Notes: 
                                                        
1 For information on ABS I mainland China survey in 2002, please see our online appendix A. 
2 Question: “[If lacking personal experiences of government corruption] Where do you learn 
about government corruption primarily?” This only captures respondents’ primary information 
sources for government corruption. In reality, people may learn about government corruption 
through multiple information sources. And this will be addressed in following sections. 
3 Interviews of journalists and editors in Guangdong, Tianjin, Shanxi, and Jiangxi, 2009. 
4 Interviews of journalist in Guangdong, 2006. 
5  Framing has been generally described as the essence of public opinion formation. Many 
scholars have shown that political elites and mass media can influence public opinion by picking 
alternative definitions or emphasizing only a subset of potentially relevant considerations. By 
these means, they may change the content of individuals’ beliefs, affect the importance 
individuals attach to particular beliefs, or cause individuals to only focus on the considerations 
favorable to politicians and overlook other considerations when constructing their opinions. See 
(Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Nelson & Oxley, 1999)  
6 For instance, when parents are choosing schools, “the grapevine is perceived as particularly 
acute at delivering information” relating to the misconduct and demeanor of students (Ball & 
Vincent, 1998, p. 381).  
7 Professor Guang Zhang at Xiamen University kindly shared with us this valuable dataset 
collected by him and his students. 
8  For the differences among official, semi-commercialized, commercialized newspapers, see 
(Stockmann, 2011). Detailed information on the coding of media coverage of corruption cases, as 
well as the list of local newspapers, is available on our online appendix B.  
9 The answer category is a 5-point ordinal scale: “Less than once a week,” “Once or twice a 
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week,” “Several times a week,” “Once every day,” and “Several times a day.” This measure 
provides a general measure of respondents’ exposure to the mass media, including newspaper, 
radio and TV programs in their daily lives. Internet was not included as mass media in the 
survey. According to Stockmann (2009), this measure may bias analysis toward insignificant 
findings. However, it is the best we can find in ABS I data. 
10 This number has been transformed through a natural logarithm function to correct the positive 
skewness in its distribution. Unlike the other two measures on information sources, this is a 
variable at the provincial-level, rather than individual-level. It serves as the proxy for the features 
of respondents’ pertinent surrounding media environment. We have also entertained the 
possibility of a curvilinear impact of this variable in regression analysis by adding its quadratic 
item. However, the quadratic item was not significant and did not change our results 
substantively. Such results are available upon request from the authors.  
11 The answer category for both questions is dichotomous: “Yes” vs. “No.” Here we measured 
respondents’ access to grapevine news based on either passive or active participation. Though we 
recognize the difference between active and passive participation in spreading grapevine news, 
they are not that different from each other when we focus on the nature of acquired information. 
Moreover, this measure also helps us minimize the possible impact of endogeneity between 
access to grapevine news and perception of corruption in local governments.  
12 This is a binary with 0 indicating unemployment. 
13 Question: “As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family 
today?” The answer category is a 5-point ordinal scale: “Very bad,” “Bad,” “So so (not good not 
bad),” “Good,” and “Very good.” 
14 Question: “What do you think the economic situation of your family will be five years from 
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now?” The answer category is a 5-point ordinal scale: “Much worse,” “A little worse,” “About 
the same,” “A little better,” and “Much better.” 
15 Question: “How would you compare the current economic situation of your family with what 
it was five years ago?” The answer category is a 5-point ordinal scale: “Much worse,” “A little 
worse,” “About the same,” “A little better,” and “Much better.” 
16 This is a continuous variable recording respondents’ real ages. 
17 This is a binary with 1 indicating males. 
18 This is an 8-point ordinal scale recording respondents’ formal educational attainment, ranging 
from “Illiteracy” to “Postgraduate.” 
19 This is a binary with 1 indicating rural residency. 
20 This is a binary based on respondents’ answers to the following question: “Have you or your 
families personally experienced any government corruption in recent years?” Positive answers 
are coded as 1. 
21  This is a binary based on respondents’ answers to the following question: “Given your 
capability and performance, do you think that you get a fair income?” Negative answers are 
coded as 1. 
22 This is a binary with 1 indicating official affiliation with the CCP. 
23 Respondents’ answers to the third statement were reversely coded. 
24 This is a binary based on respondents’ answers to the following question: “General speaking, 
would you say that ‘Most people can be trusted’ or that ‘You must be very careful in dealing with 
people’?” Endorsement of the first statement is coded as 1. 
25 Question: “How interested would you say you are in politics?” Then answer category is a 4-
point ordinal scale: “Not at all interested,” “Not very interested,” “Somewhat interested,” and 
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“Very interested.” This variable was selected for the Heckman Selection model to predict which 
respondents were more likely to provide meaningful answers when probed for their perceptions 
of corruption in local governments.  
26 Though it is impossible to differentiate between missing at random (MAR) and nonignorable 
missing (NI), in most cases multiple imputations under the MAR assumption perform very well 
as confirmed by numerous methodologists (e.g., King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001). 
27 The second approach is not free of problems, and has been increasingly criticized for its 
problematic distribution assumptions and other statistical issues (e.g., Puhani, 2000). 
28  All missing values in independent variables are filled in through model-based multiple 
imputations and all results are averaged results of five imputed data sets following the Rubin’s 
rule. Survey sampling information is systematically incorporated through SVY commands in 
STATA. To systematically incorporate the nested-structure of our combined data, i.e., 
respondents live in provinces, we also fitted a hierarchical Probit model following the same 
specification. Results are similar and available upon request from the authors. 
29  On appropriate specification and interpretation of interaction models, see (e.g., Brambor, 
Clark, & Golder, 2006; Braumoeller, 2004) . We accordingly have included all constitutive terms 
and interaction terms for valid estimation and inference. 
30 It is important to keep in mind that, given the controlled mass media in China, the coefficient 
of media exposure frequency is (and also expected to be) negative, indicating its potential in 
lowering popular perceptions of corruption in local governments.  
31  This negative interaction effect also indicates that the marginal effect of the number of 
reported corruption cases in the media is more significant among those with access to grapevine 
news. Simulation shows that when individuals do not have access to grapevine news, the 
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coefficient of the number of reported corruption cases in the media is -0.264 with a p-value of 
0.038. Among those possessing access to grapevine news, the corresponding coefficient is -0.509 
with a p-value of 0.001. 
32 This finding may seem surprising, given the widely reported collective protests in rural China 
(e.g., Li & O'Brien, 2008). However, systematic analysis based on survey data shows that, in 
rural China, most protests actually target village and township governments and rarely involve 
higher level governments. Moreover, China rural residents generally have a higher trust in 
county, city and provincial governments, despite their anger toward village and township 
governments (Li, 2008, 2011). 
33 Here we focused on people’s perceptions of government corruption, rather than corruption in 
practice. Controlled media seem to serve the Chinese authoritarian regime by lowering perceived 
corruption in government; however, it might actually facilitate corruption in practice. For the 
relationship between media freedom and corruption, see (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). 
